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Many strategic interactions in the real world take place among delegates empowered to act on
behalf of others. Managers make strategic decisions that a¤ect pro…ts; sales persons have power
over setting prices; and lawyers and sports agents represent their clients in bargaining processes.
One of the central messages of game theory is that this could be, at least partly, due to the
strategic advantage delegation may provide to the delegating party. The idea that signing binding
and publicly observable contracts with a third party may serve as a bene…cial commitment device
goes back at least to Schelling (1960), and has been put into use in many areas of economics.1
However, the observability of contracts appears to be a precondition for them to play a com-
mitment role, and for this reason, almost all applications of strategic delegation theory are couched
in terms of observable contracts. The formalization of this intuition is given by Katz (1991) who
showed that if contracts are unobservable, then the Nash equilibrium outcomes of a game with
and without delegation coincide. In particular, delegation through unobservable contracts does not
change the predicted outcome of games with a unique Nash equilibrium. These observations, in
turn, call the empirical relevance of the applied delegation studies into serious question since, in
most real-world transactions, the signed contracts are unobservable to the outside parties.
However, there are important strategic environments that fall outside the con…nes of Katz’s
analysis. First, Katz’s model does not include the scenarios in which the outcome of the decision
of delegating or not delegating is observable to the outside party. By contrast, in some models it
is natural that the outside party observes the outcome of this decision simply because (s)he knows
the identity of his/her opponent (even though (s)he does not know the nature of the associated
contract). What is more, this may well endow the delegating party with further powers (of the
forward induction type), and yield quite di¤erent insights regarding the plausibility of strategic
delegation. Second, Katz’s result focuses only on the alterations of the Nash equilibrium outcomes
that unobserved delegation may entail. This is also quite crucial because in games where actions
are taken in a sequential manner, the set of sequentially rational outcomes is generically smaller
than the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes, and hence Katz’s result does not tell us if these can be
altered through unobserved contracts.
In fact, it is not di¢cult to provide examples of extensive form games in which delegation may
obtain in some equilibrium (see Katz (1991), Fersthman and Kalai (1997)). What is not known is if
there is any reason to believe that unobservable delegation has a “bite” in a large class of extensive
form games. Put di¤erently, an open problem in the literature is the determination of the conditions
(on the primitives of such games) which guarantee that strategic delegation would arise in some
equilibrium when contracts between the principals and delegates are not observable. The harder
but more interesting problem is, in turn, to identify those games in which strategic delegation arises
in all reasonable equilibria. Our objective is to extend Katz’s analysis in a way that allows for
1A partial list includes applications in industrial organization (Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987), Skli-
vas (1987), Brander and Lewis (1986)), in international trade (Brander and Spencer (1985)), in bargaining theory
(Segendor¤ (1998)), and in monetary policy (Persson and Tabellini (1993), Jensen (1997)).
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sequential games and observable delegation decisions to tackle both of these problems.
We call any …nite two-person extensive form game (with perfect information) a principals-only
game when each player (principal) plays the game himself. Let us refer to the subgame perfect
equilibrium outcome of a principals-only game the pre-delegation outcome of that game. Given
any principals-only game, we specify a (one-sided) delegation game as follows: in the …rst stage,
one of the principals decides whether to play the game himself or to o¤er, at a cost, an incentive
contract to an agent, which speci…es the payo¤ to the agent as a function of the outcome of the
game.2 The agent, in turn, either accepts or rejects the o¤er. If the agent rejects the o¤er, the
game is played between the principal and the outside party, and the delegate receives her outside
option. If she accepts, then the game is played between the delegate and the outside party, and
the delegate receives the payo¤ as speci…ed by the contract.3 The crucial point that distinguishes
this scenario from the ones commonly considered in the literature is that, here, the outside party
does not observe the contract o¤ered, and knows only whether he is facing the principal or the
delegate.4
Our main objective is to understand the nature of the sequential equilibria of this delegation
game in which only one principal has the option to delegate. The …rst observation is that, provided
that the cost of hiring an agent is relatively low, delegation may obtain in equilibrium, and this
for essentially any principals-only game. More importantly, the outcome induced by delegation in
(again essentially any) principals-only game can be quite di¤erent from the pre-delegation outcome
of this game. This observation shows that, even under fully unobservable contracts, the act of del-
egation may possess commitment powers that would alter the outcome which would have obtained
in the absence of delegation.
However, this …nding bears an “it is possible that ...” sort of a statement, and hence pro-
vides only limited support for the presence of strategic delegation under unobservability. Yet, if
we strengthen our equilibrium concept in a reasonable manner, we can understand the strategic
consequences of unobserved delegation substantially better. For instance, it is possible to use a
forward induction type argument to re…ne the equilibrium to show that delegation is essentially
inevitable if the pre-delegation payo¤ of the delegating party is not already the best that he can
obtain within a potentially large set of Nash equilibrium payo¤s of the principals-only game.5 The
idea is simply that forward induction reinstates the commitment power of delegation since, under
the forward induction hypothesis, the outside party interprets a delegation decision also as a signal
2 In this paper, we study the scenarios in which only one party has the option to delegate. Understanding this
simpler scenario is a prerequisite for a proper analysis of the more complicated (but obviously more realistic) case of
two-sided delegation. While we will later comment brie‡y on how our results modify in this case, we should refer the
reader to Koçkesen (1999b) for an extensive analysis of the issue.
3To concentrate on the strategic elements of delegation we assume that (1) the agent’s sole function is to make
decisions which does not require any e¤ort, and (2) the principal and the agent are symmetrically informed.
4We continue to assume, however, that no renegotiation of the contract between the principal and the delegate
may take place after the game commences.
5Clearly, it is mainly at this point that positing the realistic assumption of the observability of the identity of
the delegate (and hence that of the outcome of “to delegate or not to delegate” decision of the principal) pays its
dividends. This contrasts with Katz (1991) in whose model the principal does not have the option of not delegating.
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about the contract that is signed. (Why would the principal pay an agent to play the game in place
of him, unless he did not instruct the agent to play in a manner that improves his situation over
the pre-delegation outcome even after paying the cost of hiring an agent?)
Unfortunately, forward induction type arguments that yield the above conclusion run into for-
mal di¢culties in delegation games, as we shall explain in the sequel. Consequently, we prove here
the same result by using instead another intuitive equilibrium re…nement, the well-supported equi-
librium, which is based on imposing certain reasonable restrictions on the out-of-equilibrium beliefs
and behavior of the players.6 Our main result is that if there exists a Nash equilibrium outcome
of the principals-only game in which (i) the delegating principal receives a payo¤ strictly greater
than his pre-delegation payo¤, (ii) the outside party behaves sequentially rationally, then in any
well-supported equilibrium, the principal will certainly choose to delegate rather than playing the
game himself, provided that the cost of hiring an agent is not too high. Moreover, this will alter
the pre-delegation outcome in a way that is (strictly) bene…cial for the delegating party.
The main message of the present paper may then be succinctly put as follows: To the extent
that renegotiation is costly and/or limited, in a general class of economic settings, strategic aspects
of delegation may play an important role in contract design, even if the contracts are completely
unobservable.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes a simple delegation game to provide
motivation for our inquiry and develop the intuition behind our main results. In Section 3, we
introduce the basic nomenclature and formally introduce the equilibrium re…nement that we propose
here. Section 4 formally describes the economic environment within which we analyze the main
question of the paper. In turn, we present our main results in Section 5, and discuss some potential
extensions along with some open questions in Section 6. The proofs are contained in Section 7.
2 Motivation: A Simple Bargaining Example
In order to illustrate the basic intuition behind our results we shall …rst analyze a simple ultimatum
bargaining game in which player 1 gives either a low o¤er to player 2 (denoted l) or a high o¤er
(denoted h); and player 2 either accepts (denoted y) or rejects (denoted n) the o¤er. If player 1
o¤ers l and player 2 accepts, payo¤s are $5 and $1 for player 1 and player 2, respectively: If player
1 o¤ers h and player 2 accepts, then player 1 receives $1 and player 2 receives $5. If an o¤er is
rejected, both players receive a payo¤ of zero. We refer to this game as the principals-only game,
and note that it has two Nash equilibrium outcomes (l; y) and (h; y): However, only one of these
outcomes is not based on incredible threats by player 2 (i.e., it is the outcome of a subgame perfect
equilibrium): player 1 o¤ers l and player 2 accepts.
Now, assume that one of the players (principals) has the option of hiring a third player (whom
we call the agent (or the delegate) and denote by A) to play the game for him. More precisely, a
player can either play the game himself, that is, not hire a delegate (this action is denoted :D);
6Similar re…nements are proposed by McLennan (1985) and Hillas (1994), and discussed extensively in Kreps
(1989).
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or he can o¤er a contract to the agent, at a cost c > 0, which speci…es her payo¤s as a function
of the outcome of the principals-only game. In turn, the delegate can either accept or reject the
contract. In case of rejection, player 1 and 2 play the game themselves, receive the same payo¤s
as in the principals-only game, except that player 2 pays the contracting cost c; and the delegate
receives her outside option ± > 0: If, on the other hand, she accepts the contract, then the delegate
plays the game in place of the delegating player, and at any given outcome, she receives whatever
the contract speci…es for her, the delegating player receives the principals-only game payo¤ minus
the cost of hiring, and the other player receives the same payo¤ as in the principals-only game.7
While our description of it is not yet complete, we shall loosely refer to the resulting game as a
delegation game in what follows.
Let us begin by observing that if it is player 1 who has the option of hiring an agent, then
irrespective of which contracts are feasible and whether they are observable or not, the unique
equilibrium of the delegation game would be characterized by player 1 not hiring and hence sus-
taining his subgame perfect equilibrium payo¤. After all, $5 is the largest possible payo¤ player 1
can hope for in this game, and he expects to receive this payo¤ if he plays the game himself.8 Con-
sequently, the query is interesting only when it is rather player 2 who has the option of delegating.
Moreover, it is easy to see that if the cost of hiring a delegate is too high, i.e., ±+c > 4; then in any
sequential equilibrium of the delegation game (independent of contracts being observable or not)
player 2 chooses to play the game himself. Therefore, we will analyze the case where ± + c < 4:
Let us assume that there are only two contracts available to player 2, T (for tough) and W (for
weak); which are speci…ed as follows:
T =
(




±; if outcome is in f(l; y); (h; y)g
0; otherwise
:
For simplicity, we will assume that the delegate accepts any contract that yields her at least her
outside option as expected payo¤. (This assumption can be relaxed, provided that one enlarges the
contract space suitably.) Therefore, the delegate accepts any contract o¤er in the menu fT;Wg
since, irrespective of player 1’s o¤er, there is always an action which would earn her ±:
If the contract signed between player 2 and his delegate were observable to player 1, then the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the delegation game would have player 2 o¤ering
the contract T; player 1 o¤ering h and the delegate accepting the o¤er. This is of course nothing
but a simple demonstration of the bene…cial commitment e¤ects of observable delegation. Things
get a bit more complicated, however, if we (realistically) assume that only the decision to hire a
delegate or not is observable by player 1, not the contract o¤ered. The description of the game
7Of course, the delegating player could himself earn an outside option by delegating. We, however, assume that
the outside option of this player is zero to make the analysis interesting. Clearly, if this outside option was large
relative to the potential payo¤s in the game, delegation would obtain due to nonstrategic reasons.
8This observation is true only in the case of one-sided delegation. If the delegation game is two-sided, then,
as Koçkesen (1999b) shows, there is an equilibrium in which both players randomize between delegating and not
delegating.
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becomes complete under this informational assumption; we refer to this game as the delegation
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Figure 1: Delegation in Ultimatum Bargaining.
There are two types of sequential equilibria of this game. The …rst type is characterized by
player 2 not delegating, and the second is characterized by player 2 choosing an action other than
:D: In all equilibria of the …rst type, following player 2’s action, player 1 o¤ers l and player 2
accepts. At the out-of-equilibrium information set following an accepted contract (denoted Ia in
Figure 1), player 1 believes that contract W has been o¤ered with at least probability 1=5 and he
plays l with at least probability 1¡ (± + c) =4. In the second type of equilibrium, player 2 places
at least probability 4=5 on contract T and, at the information set Ia, player 1 plays h.
While all of these equilibria are in fact trembling-hand perfect (Katz (1991), Fersthman and
Kalai (1997)), it is still possible to take issue with the plausibility of a …rst type of equilibrium.
To simplify the discussion, let us …rst allow only for pure strategies. (The case of mixed strategies
are taken up in Subsection 3.2; see Example 2.) The point is that, in this case, we can apply
a natural forward induction argument to “kill” any of the …rst type of equilibria. In particular,
no such equilibrium survives the forward induction test proposed by van Damme (1989). In any
9For simplicity, we truncated the branches of the game tree following the delegate’s action r and replaced them
by the equilibrium outcomes which would be realized if the play were ever to reach there.
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pure strategy equilibrium that passes this test, player 2 o¤ers the contract T and player 1 plays h:
forward induction ensures delegation even if the contracts are unobservable.
Another observation which points out to what is unreasonable about the …rst type of equilibrium
is that the contract W; which aligns the incentives of player 2 and the agent, is not o¤ered in any
pure strategy equilibria of the game since player 2 would be better o¤ by playing the game himself
rather than hiring an agent through the contract W . Yet, the only way one can support an
equilibrium in which player 2 plays :D is by assuming that player 1 believes at Ia that the agent
he is facing has been o¤ered nothing but the contract W !
In the …nal analysis, whether such beliefs are reasonable or not are formally captured in the
equilibrium concept one adopts to “solve” the game. The out-of-equilibrium beliefs supporting an
equilibrium of the …rst type (in which player 2 plays :D) are justi…ed in a sequential equilibrium
simply because player 1 thinks that player 2 has made a mistake, without trying to make further
inferences regarding player 2’s possible play which caused the information set Ia to be reached.
Suppose, in contrast, that player 1 rather reasons, upon facing a delegate unexpectedly, that it is
actually he who made a mistake in assuming that a …rst type of equilibrium is accepted as the
current norm. (Kreps (1989) calls re…nements based on this line of reasoning “mistaken theory”
re…nements; see Section 3.) He may then well conclude that player 2 is playing according to some
other equilibrium in which a delegate is hired. But, in no such equilibrium player 2 o¤ers the
contract W; and therefore, so player 1 reasons, W cannot be the contract that is signed. Given
that his beliefs put probability zero on contract W; player 1’s optimal action is h and hence player
2 strictly prefers to delegate in any equilibrium which survives a “mistaken theory” re…nement.
It is not clear which interpretation (“mistakes” or “mistaken theories”) is more plausible in
general. The answer is likely to depend on the situation being analyzed. In delegation games,
however, there is reason to believe that the second interpretation is more convincing. These games
depict situations in which individuals decide whether to hire someone to act on their behalf or not
in a strategic interaction. It would not be reasonable to think that such a decision, which in reality
requires time and e¤ort, takes place without careful deliberation. Hiring someone is a costly action
and it is unlikely to take place as a result of sheer irrationality or a simple mistake. Arguably,
therefore, in all “reasonable” equilibria of the above delegation game, player 2 hires a delegate and
o¤ers a contract so that the equilibrium outcome is di¤erent from the subgame perfect equilibrium
outcome of the principals-only game. Hence, we contend that delegation is likely to ensue even by
means of unobservable contracts; this is the main thesis we shall defend formally in this paper.
In the rest of the analysis, we shall consider arbitrary extensive form principals-only games with
perfect information, and derive necessary and su¢cient conditions for the existence of commitment
value of delegation under unobservable contracts. More precisely, we will show that if there exists a
Nash equilibrium outcome of the principals-only game in which (i) the delegating principal receives
a payo¤ strictly greater than her subgame perfect equilibrium payo¤, and (ii) the outside party
behaves sequentially rationally, then in any well-supported equilibrium, the principal will certainly





Following Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), we de…ne a …nite-horizon extensive form game as a
collection
¨ ´ [N;H;P; (Ii; ¼i)i2N ]:
HereN denotes a …nite set of players; andH stands for a …nite comprehensive set of …nite sequences
interpreted as the set of all histories.10 An history h is said to be terminal if (h; a) =2 H for any
a 6= ;; we denote by Z the set of all terminal histories. The function ¼i : Z ! R is the payo¤ function
of player i; and the function P : HnZ ! N is the player function. If P (h) = i, we understand that i
moves immediately after history h and chooses an action from the set A(h) ´ fa 6= ; : (h; a) 2 Hg:
For each i; Ii is a partition of H(i) ´ fh 2 H : P (h) = ig such that A(h) = A(h0) whenever
h; h0 2 I 2 Ii. Consequently, without ambiguity, we may write A(I) (P (I); resp.) instead of A(h)
(P (h), resp.) for any h 2 I: Any member of Ii is called an information set for player i: If all
information sets in ¨ are singletons, we say that this game is with perfect information, and omit
information partitions in its de…nition: The subgames of ¨ are de…ned in the usual way.
A behavioral strategy for player i is de…ned as a set of independent probability measures ¯i ´
f¯i[I] : I 2 Iig where ¯i[I] is de…ned on A(I): One may write ¯i[h] for ¯i[I] for any h 2 I with the
understanding that for any h and h0 that belong to the same information set, we have ¯i[h] = ¯i[h0].
The set of all behavioral strategies of player i is denoted Si(¨); whereas S(¨) ´ £i2NSi(¨): We
denote the set of all Nash and subgame perfect equilibria of ¨ in behavioral strategies by NE(¨)
and SPE(¨); respectively.
By a system of beliefs, we mean a set ¹ ´ f¹[I] : I 2 Ii for some ig; where ¹[I] is a probability
measure on I:We denote the set of all systems of beliefs by B(¨): A 2-tuple (¯; ¹) 2 S(¨)£B(¨)
is called an assessment. An assessment is said to be a sequential equilibrium if it satis…es the
properties of consistency and sequential rationality (see Section 7.A for formal de…nitions). We
denote the set of all such assessments as SE(¨): The set of all equilibria in SE(¨) that reach to
the information set I with positive probability is denoted SE(¨; I):
3.2 Well-Supported Bayesian Equilibria
We next introduce a re…nement of sequential equilibria that will play a central role in this pa-
per. Like many others, this re…nement too is based on imposing certain restrictions on the out-
of-equilibrium beliefs and strategies of the players. Informally put, it leads us to those “well-
supported” sequential equilibria that envisage that at each out-of-equilibrium information set, the
beliefs and behavior of the players are consistent with at least one sequential equilibrium that
admits this information set on its equilibrium path, provided that such an equilibrium exists.
10By comprehensiveness of H, we mean that ; 2 H; and, for any integer k > 1; (a1; :::; ak) 2 H whenever
(a1; :::; ak+1) 2 H: The length of a history h = (a1; :::; ak) is de…ned to be k and denoted by jhj: As a convention, we
take j;j = 0 and let (h; ;) = h for any h 2 H:
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Here we shall give the formal de…nition of our re…nement as it applies only to the class of all
extensive form games which do not possess an imperfect information subgame which is distinct
from the original game. We denote this class of games by G. Our formal treatment is distilled to
its simplest form in the context of such games, thereby making the intuition behind the re…nement
proposed here transparent. Moreover, the set of games which is the focus of this paper is a subset
of G; so this simpli…ed treatment does not cause a loss of generality for our purposes.11
For any ¨ 2 G and any ¯ 2 S(¨); we de…ne Ii(¯) as the set of all information sets of player i
that are reached by ¯ with positive probability, and for any information set I; we let Ii(I) be the
set of all information sets of i that follow I:12 On the other hand, J (¯) stands for the set of all
nonsingleton information sets that could be reached with the shortest sequence of actions after a
deviation from ¯P (;)[;]; while they are surely not reached when ¯P (;)[;] is played.13
De…nition 1. Let ¨ 2 G: A sequential equilibrium (¯; ¹) 2 SE(¨) is said to be well-supported
if, and only if, for each I 2 J (¯); either SE(¨; I) = ? or there exists a (¯0; ¹0) 2 SE(¨; I) such
that
¹[J ] = ¹0[J ] and ¯P (I)[J ] = ¯
0
P (I)[J ] (1)
for all J 2 IP (I)(I):We denote the set of all well-supported sequential equilibria of ¨ by SEw-s(¨):
To clarify things, let us take a two-player game ¨ 2 G. Suppose that player 1 moves …rst in
this game and suppose that I is a …rst nonsingleton information set of player 2 which is on the
out-of-equilibrium path (i.e., I 2 J (¯)). Player 1’s move may indeed be a part of a sequential
equilibrium (¯; ¹); provided that it is suitably supported by beliefs and the continuation strategy
of player 2 at the out-of-equilibrium information set I: In a sequential equilibrium, if I is ever
reached, player 2 could interpret this as a simple “mistake.” This, however, goes counter to the
idea that player 1’s deviation could be evaluated by player 2 as containing information about player
1’s past (unobserved) actions.
How will player 2 reason when he …nds himself at I which was not supposed to be reached in
the equilibrium that is being played? She may plausibly think that player 1 is after coordinating
on a di¤erent equilibrium, provided that an equilibrium that reaches I exists (i.e., SE(¨; I) 6= ;).
Of course, if SE(¨; I) = ;; then there is no such plausible explanation of 1’s deviation, and hence
no restriction is imposed on 2’s beliefs and behavior at I: On the other hand, if there exists
exactly one such equilibrium, then (¯; ¹) is well-supported only if the beliefs and the strategy of
player 2 following this information set accord with what is speci…ed by (¯; ¹): This is precisely the
requirement embodied in (1). Alternatively, if there exist more than one such equilibrium, then
11 It is not di¢cult to generalize the de…nition of well-supported equilibrium to the class of all …nite extensive form
games by means of an inductive argument that admits the de…nition we present here as the …rst step of the induction
process. (See Koçkesen (1999a), pp. 91-94.)
12Formally speaking, Ii(I) ´ fJ 2 Ii : h00 2 J i¤ h00 = (h; h0) for some h 2 Ig: Notice that I 2 Ii(I).
13To de…ne J (¯) formally, de…ne S(¯P (;)[;]) as the set of all behavioral strategy pro…les in which the …rst mover
in the game plays ¯P (;)[;] at the initial node. De…ne next Q(¯P (;)[;]) as the set of all non-singleton information
sets that do not belong to [i2N [¯02S(¯P (;)[;]) Ii(¯0): We have I 2 J (¯) if and only if I 2 Q(¯P (;)[;]) and for any
J 2 Q(¯P (;)[;]) there do not exist h0 and h00 6= ; such that h0 2 J and (h0; h00) 2 I:
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(¯; ¹) is well-supported only if the continuation beliefs and the strategy of player 2 agrees with that
of at least one such equilibrium.14
Example 1. (Battle of the sexes with an outside option)15 Consider the game ¨ 2 G
depicted in Figure 2. In this game there are two types of equilibria; one in which ¯1[;](O) = 1
and one in which ¯1[;](T ) = 1. For the …rst type of equilibria, we must have either ¯2[I](R) = 1
and ¹[I](T ) < 3=4 or ¯2[I](L) 6 2=3 and ¹[I](T ) = 3=4: The unique second type of equilibrium,
however, has it that ¯2[I](L) = 1 and ¹[I](T ) = 1: For the …rst type of equilibria we have J (¯) =
fIg, that is, I is the only out-of-equilibrium information set to check. Since only the second type
of equilibrium reaches I, if a …rst type of equilibrium is well-supported, it must have ¯2[I](L) = 1
and ¹[I](T ) = 1; that is, part (c) of the de…nition must hold. Since this is not the case, we conclude
that none of the …rst type of equilibria is well-supported. The unique well-supported equilibrium
outcome of ¨ is then (T;L) with the payo¤ pro…le (3; 1): Notably, this is also the unique outcome





















































Figure 2: Battle of the Sexes with an Outside Option
Example 2. (A simple bargaining game (cntd.)) Consider the simple bargaining game
discussed in Section 2. It is easy to show that any equilibrium in this game in which player 2
chooses :D with positive probability (…rst type of equilibria) is not well-supported. In any such
equilibrium, we have ¯2[;](:D) > 0; J (¯) = fIag and ¯1[Ia](l) > 0; whereas in all equilibria
14 In games with more than two players, there is reason to view the well-supportedness requirement as too stringent,
for in such games it may be desirable to restrict the beliefs/behavior of players at an o¤-equilibrium information set
only when all players are aware that this set lies on an o¤-the-equilibrium path. While this sort of a weakening is
easy to formalize, because such an issue does not arise within the general class of delegation games that we shall be
concerned with here (there is only one party who needs to identify the o¤-equilibrium nonsingleton information sets
in such games), we choose to adopt the simpler formulation given in De…nition 1. Koçkesen and Ok (1999) de…ne
and discuss the weaker version of the well-supported equilibrium concept.
15This example is due to Kohlberg and is probably the most commonly used game in motivating the basic idea
behind the notion of forward induction. It is also experimentally analyzed by Cooper et al. (1993) who provided
mixed evidence in support of the forward induction hypothesis.
16The last two observations remain true if we break up the moves of player 1 into two component parts so that he
…rst decides whether to choose O or N , and only after he chooses N he decides between T and B:
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that reach information set Ia (the second type of equilibria) player 1 o¤ers l with zero probability:
On the other hand, all the equilibria of the second type, i.e., delegation equilibria, are trivially
well-supported.
It can be checked that the latter equilibria do not survive the iterated elimination of weakly
dominated strategies, and hence do not form a strategically stable set. Yet, if one slightly perturbs
the game so that there is a positive probability, however small, that the o¤ered contracts are
observed, one can show that delegation equilibrium survives the iterated elimination of weakly
dominated strategies. k
We next comment brie‡y on how the well-supportedness criterion relates to some other major
equilibrium re…nements proposed in the literature.
Remarks. (1) (Well-Supportedness, Forward Induction, and the “Mistaken Theory” Re…nements)
As noted earlier, Kreps (1989) refers to solution concepts that are based on the idea that deviations
should, when possible, be viewed as players coordinating on other equilibria as “mistaken theory”
re…nements. A version of this approach was …rst developed by McLennan (1985) who argued that
“deviations from the equilibrium path are more probable if they can be explained in terms of some
confusion over which sequential equilibrium is “in e¤ect”.” (McLennan (1985), p. 891). This is
also the leading motivation behind the forward-induction re…nements of van Damme (1989) and
Al-Najjar (1995), as well as the re…nements proposed by Hillas (1994) and our well-supportedness
concept.17
The forward induction re…nement proposed by van Damme (1989) may be found too weak
due to its reliance on the viability requirement. (This condition postulates that a deviation is
viewed as an unambiguous signal only if there is a unique continuation equilibrium that makes
the deviation pro…table for the deviating party.) For this reason, Al-Najjar (1995) has proposed a
stronger re…nement that does away with this requirement. Unfortunately, as shown by examples in
that paper, this re…nement is in a sense “too strong” for it may well eliminate certain reasonable
equilibria. Intuitively speaking, the well-supported equilibrium concept falls in between these two
re…nements, at least in the present setup. In particular, van Damme’s forward induction criterion
is not su¢cient for our second main result (even if we restrict the analysis to pure strategies). On
the other hand, Al-Najjar’s re…nement delivers that result easily, albeit at the cost of potentially
eliminating some equilibria (in which delegation does not take place) in an ad hoc manner.18 By
contrast, while well-supported equilibrium is weaker than Al-Najjar’s re…nement,19 it is strong
17As a caveat, however, we note that some other conceptualizations of forward induction (that are linked inherently
to the notion of the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies), such as that of Kohlberg (1990), is not a
“mistaken theory” re…nement.
18Observe that, in contrast to the pure strategy analysis given in Section 2, van Damme’s forward induction
re…nement does not yield the result reported in Example 2 (since there are more than one sequential equilibrium with
delegation that leave to player 2 a payo¤ strictly higher than his subgame perfect equilibrium payo¤). Al-Najjar’s
re…nement, on the other hand, agrees in this game fully with the well-supported equilibrium.
19This claim is formal in the context of delegation games that we consider here. One can also easily check that our
re…nement behaves well in the examples that Al-Najjar has considered to illustrate the shortcomings of his re…nement.
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enough to eliminate all “no-delegation equilibria.”
Perhaps the best formalization of the “mistaken theory” approach is provided by Hillas (1994).
The well-supported equilibrium is quite close to the re…nements considered by Hillas both in mo-
tivation and in formalization. For the record, we report that Hillas’s …rst two re…nements (where
restrictions are imposed either only on beliefs or only on choice behavior at every information set)
are not strong enough for our purposes. His third re…nement puts restrictions on both beliefs and
behavior, and is strong enough for our results to go through. The well-supported equilibrium con-
cept is, however, not only weaker than this re…nement, but also much simpler to apply within the
delegation games that we study here.
(2) (Well-Supportedness vs. Strategic Stability) The main example analyzed by van Damme
(1989, pp. 485-87) shows that strategically stable equilibria (Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)) need
not satisfy his forward induction criterion. Since the requirement of well-supportedness chooses
precisely the equilibrium chosen by van Damme’s forward induction concept in his example, we
may also conclude that strategic stability does not imply well-supportedness. Conversely, a well-
supported equilibrium may not survive iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies, and
hence need not be strategically stable. (See Example 2.) This discrepancy between strategic
stability and well-supportedness is not surprising. Like most other similar “mistaken theory” re-
…nements, well-supportedness is logically independent of the notion of the iterated elimination of
weakly dominated strategies, whereas strategic stability admits this notion as a prerequisite. k
We think of well-supportedness as a reasonable (and a somewhat weak) re…nement of the se-
quential equilibria. Rather than arguing for the superiority of our re…nement over others, however,
we subscribe here to the view that “the validity of a particular re…nement for the analysis of a par-
ticular economic issue may depend on the setting of that issue in ways that go beyond the formal
game-theoretic model that is adopted” (Kreps (1989), p. 7.) The main objective of this paper is to
use the concept of “well-supportedness” in an economic setting in which it is particularly sensible
and only mildly demanding. Moreover, in this context, we shall see that it allows one to obtain
considerable insight with regard to the underlying economic problem. We turn next to describing
this problem in detail.
4 One-Sided Delegation Environments
In this section we shall introduce a general environment in which we shall study the problem of
delegation by unobservable incentive contracts. As one might expect, the framework we outline
below admits the simple bargaining-delegation model studied in Section 2 as a special case.
We begin by …xing an arbitrary …nite perfect information principals-only game
¡ = [f1; 2g; H;P; (¼1; ¼2)]:
We assume that this game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, which we consider as
the pre-delegation outcome of the environment prior to delegation. We denote the (pre-delegation)
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expected payo¤ of player i in equilibrium by ¦SPEi : The set of all Nash equilibrium payo¤s of i is in
turn denoted by ¦NEi (¡): In what follows, we assume that ¦
NE
i (¡) is a …nite set for each i = 1; 2:
20
Let NE¤i (¡) denote the set of Nash equilibria of ¡ in which the behavioral strategy of player i
is sequentially rational after every history.21 We denote the set of all expected payo¤s for j that
correspond to the strategy pro…les in NE¤i (¡) by ¦
NE¤i
j (¡):
Suppose that player 2 is contemplating about hiring an agent to play the game ¡ in place of
him. The outside option of this agent, henceforth called player A; is a constant ± > 0: That is,
player A receives ± dollars with certainty if she rejects the contract o¤ered by player 2. Moreover,
we assume that player 2 incurs a contracting cost of c > 0 dollars in case he decides to delegate.
In the literature on strategic contract design, a contract is sometimes de…ned as a mapping
that speci…es a level of payment for each strategy of the agent in S2(¡): Such a contract provides
an extensive amount of control to the principal, and usually simpli…es the analysis considerably.
However, especially when randomization is allowed, this de…nition would lead one to view a contract
as an unrealistically complicated object. Moreover, it is not at all clear how a principal could in
general “observe” the randomized strategy choice of an agent, which, to be able to submit the
agent’s compensation, he must. At the very least, this would necessitate to extend the model to
account for private monitoring of the agent.
In our model a contract is a function that maps the …nite set of terminal nodes Z of the game
¡ to the set of payments: In fact, it will be su¢cient here to focus on those simple contracts
that pay the agent either her outside option or nothing at all. Thus, the contract space in our
model will be designated as f0; ±gZ : Evidently, any member of f0; ±gZ is an incentive contract that
can be conditioned only on the pure outcomes of the game rather than the delegate’s strategy.22
While working with such contracts introduces a number di¢culties regarding the formal analysis,
it brings us a step closer to realism and avoids worrying about issues related to the “monitoring”
of the agents since the pure outcomes of the game ¡ are observable.
The primitives of our model is thus the game ¡; the outside option ± > 0 and the contracting
cost c > 0: We thus refer to the 3-tuple [¡; ±; c] as a one-sided delegation environment. Such an
environment naturally induces a delegation game
¤(¡; ±; c) ´ [f1; 2; Ag; H¤; P ¤; (I¤i ; ¼¤i )i2f1;2;Ag]
which is a 3-person extensive form game that will on occasion be simply denoted as ¤: The game
begins with player 2 deciding between taking the action of not delegating (denoted :D) and an
action of attempting to delegate by o¤ering a contract f 2 f0; ±gZ ; which the agent A may accept
20Finiteness of ¦NEi (¡) is an assumption that helps us avoid some technical redundancies and is generically true
for …nite extensive form games (Kreps and Wilson (1982)).
21Formally, ¯¤ 2 NE¤i (¡) i¤ ¯¤ 2 NE(¡) and, for each h 2 H(i); we have ¯¤i 2 argmax¯i2Si(¡)¦i(¯i; ¯¤¡i jh) where
¦i(¢ jh) is the expected payo¤ of player i conditional on history h being reached.
22The distinction is reminiscent of the distinction made by Fershtman and Kalai (1997) between incentive and
instructive delegation. (In the former case, the delegate is given an incentive scheme correlating her payments with
performance, and in the latter case, she is directly given a strategy that she must follow).
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(denoted a) or reject (denoted r).23 If player 2 chooses not to delegate, or he chooses to o¤er
a contract but this contract is rejected by A; then ¡ is played between players 1 and 2. But if
player 2 o¤ers a contract f that agent A accepts, then, A (instead of player 2) plays the game
¡ against player 1. Therefore, there are three types of histories in H¤: Histories that pertain to
the no delegation decision (e.g. (:D;h)) can be identi…ed with those of the principals-only game
(that is, with h). Similarly, histories that pertain to a rejected contract o¤er (e.g. (f; r; h)) can be
identi…ed with those of ¡: On the other hand, on the path of a history like (f; a; h); the contract
o¤er f is accepted, and the game reached to h 2 H with agent A playing in place of player 2.24
Of course, with or without delegation, the play in ¤ must lead to an outcome of the principals-
only game. Indeed, to any terminal history z¤ 2 Z¤; there corresponds a unique outcome z 2 Z
in ¡ such that z¤ 2 f(:D; z); (f; r; z); (f; a; z)g: We shall refer to this terminal history z as a pure
outcome induced by z¤ in ¡:
It is crucial to recognize that while player 1 observes whether or not a contract is accepted, that
is, he always knows the identity of her opponent, he does not observe which contract is accepted
(or rejected). Hence, once a contract is accepted, player 1 does not know the payo¤ function of
his opponent (i.e., of player A). Players 2 and A; on the other hand, possess perfect information
throughout the game so that all of their information sets are singletons.25
Next we need to specify the payo¤ functions of the players. Since player 1 is not involved with
any sort of a delegation activity, we have ¼¤1(:D; z) ´ ¼¤1(f; µ; z) ´ ¼1(z) for all z 2 Z; µ 2 fa; rg;
and f 2 f0; ±gZ : Similarly, the payo¤s of player 2 would not be altered if he chooses not to delegate,
that is, ¼¤2(:D; z) ´ ¼2(z) for all z 2 Z: On the other hand, player 2 incurs the cost c if he chooses
to o¤er a contract, and pays the promised compensation to the agent in case a contract is signed.
Therefore,
¼¤2(f; µ; z) ´
(
¼2(z)¡ f(z)¡ c; if µ = a
¼2(z)¡ c; if µ = r
for all z and f . Finally, the delegate’s payo¤s are determined as ¼¤A(:D; z) ´ ¼¤A(f; r; z) ´ ± and
¼¤A(f; a; z) ´ f(z) for all z and f: This completes the description of the delegation game ¤(¡; ±; c):
In what follows, we shall investigate the sequential equilibria of ¤: However, to avoid certain
technical di¢culties, we shall restrict ourselves to a particular subclass of SE(¤) in which the
equilibrium strategy of the agent A is to accept a contract whenever the expected value of the
contract equals his outside option ±: So, henceforth, all references to a sequential equilibrium of
23An alternative model would have player 2 choosing …rst between not delegating and delegating, and then choosing
a contract if he decides to delegate. All our results go through under this alternative modeling assumption.
24For concreteness, we note that H¤ ´ (f:Dg £H) [ ¡f0; ±gZ £ fa; rg £H¢ : The player function P ¤ is de…ned
on the nonterminal histories in H¤ by letting P ¤(?) ´ 2; P ¤(f) ´ A; P ¤(:D;h) ´ P ¤(f; r; h) ´ P (h); and …nally,
P ¤(f; a; h) ´ A if P (h) = 2; and P ¤(f; a; h) ´ 1 if P (h) = 1:
25Thus, the information partition of player 1 is
I¤1 ´ ff(:D;h)g : h 2 H(1)g [ f[ff(f; µ; h)g : µ 2 fa; rg; h 2 H(1)g;
whereas I¤2 ´ f;g[ff(:D;h)g : h 2 H(1)g[ff(f; r; h)g : f 2 f0; ±gZ ; h 2 H(2)g and I¤A ´ ff(f; a; h)g : f 2 f0; ±gZ ;
h 2 H(2)g:
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¤ should be taken to apply only to this subclass. While this sort of a tie-breaking assumption
is commonly invoked in the related literature, it nevertheless amounts to a somewhat arbitrary
equilibrium re…nement, and hence may justly be found objectionable. Fortunately, all of our results
remain valid verbatim when this restriction is dispensed with, provided that one allows for an in…nite
contract space (like RZ), and de…ne strategies and beliefs in terms of simple probability measures.
However, the analysis of the resulting model is substantially more complicated than the present one
while it does not provide new insights. For this reason, we adopt here the standard tie-breaking
postulate stated above without apology, and refer the reader to Koçkesen and Ok (1999) for the
more general analysis.
5 The Main Results
Fix a one-sided delegation environment [¡; ±; c]: As noted earlier, our main objective here is to
understand the nature of the equilibria of the induced delegation game ¤(¡; ±; c) as it pertains to
the implications of the possibility of delegation. Thus, the …rst question we need to address is
if delegation takes place in equilibrium at all, while the second question is if the pre-delegation
equilibrium outcome of the game ¡ is altered, provided that at least some degree of delegation
takes place in equilibrium. The literature on delegation since the in‡uential contribution of Katz
(1991) exhibits clearly the contention that neither of these questions have an a¢rmative answer.
Indeed, the analysis of Katz (1991) culminates in showing that the Nash equilibrium outcomes of
the principals-only game, and only these outcomes, can be reached via unobserved delegation in
the Nash equilibria of the delegation game which satis…es a weak sequential rationality constraint.
Consequently, a sequentially rational equilibrium outcome of the delegation game has to be a Nash
equilibrium outcome of the principals-only game. More precisely, in the present setting, we have
Proposition 1. If the pure outcome z¤ is reached with positive probability in a sequential equilib-
rium of the delegation game ¤(¡; ±; c); then the pure outcome induced by z¤ in the principals-only
game ¡ can be reached with positive probability in a Nash equilibrium of ¡ in which player 1 plays
sequentially rationally at every history:
The intuition behind this result is quite simple. Since the contract o¤ered by player 2 is
not observable, the outside party, i.e., player 1, cannot condition his strategy on the contract.
Therefore, rationality of player 1 implies that he must be o¤ering a contract that induces the agent
to best respond to player 1 in terms of player 2’s preferences. Similarly, rationality and consistency
imply that player 1 must best respond to the agent’s strategy that is induced by such an optimal
contract. This entails that any sequential equilibrium outcome of the delegation game must be a
Nash equilibrium outcome of the principals-only game. The last part of the claim which states
that player 1’s strategy must be sequentially rational at every history is just an easy implication of
sequential rationality.
Moreover, it can be shown that the set of expected payo¤s of the principal 2 (gross of the cost of
hiring) obtained in a sequential equilibrium of ¤(¡; ±; c) lies in the convex hull of NE¤1(¡) payo¤s of
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principal 2 which are at least as large as his subgame perfect equilibrium payo¤ in game ¡. Thus,
the possibility of delegation does not alter in a payo¤-relevant way the set of Nash equilibrium
outcomes of the principals-only game. In particular, we have the following negative result.
Corollary 1. If ¡ is a simultaneous move game with a unique Nash equilibrium, then the out-
come of this equilibrium is identical to that of any sequential equilibrium of the delegation game
¤(¡; ±; c):26
It is undeniable that Corollary 1 (the main thrust of which should be credited to Katz (1991))
creates severe di¢culties for the well-known (perfect information) delegation results that concern
simultaneous move principals-only games such as those of Vickers (1985), Fersthman and Judd
(1987) and Sklivas (1987). However, as noted by Fersthman and Kalai (1997), its implications
become limited when we shift our focus to games with sequential moves.
We show below that there is a formal sense in which Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 are incomplete
descriptions of matters in the case of extensive form principals-only games. While, if the cost of
delegation ± + c is too high, delegation does not obtain for such games either, for low enough
± + c; the situation is vastly di¤erent. In particular, it turns out that, for small ± + c; any Nash
equilibrium payo¤ of the delegating principal, which is at least as large as his subgame perfect
equilibrium payo¤, and which can be obtained via a sequentially rational strategy of the outside
party can also be obtained as a sequential equilibrium payo¤ of the delegation game. This is, in
fact, a complete characterization of the set of all sequential equilibrium payo¤s of ¤(¡; ±; c); and is
our …rst main result.
Theorem 1. There exists an ` > 0 such that ± + c < ` implies that
¦SE2 (¤(¡; ±; c)) = f¦2 2¦NE
¤
1
2 (¡) : ¦2 > ¦SPE2 g;
where ¦SE2 (¤(¡; ±; c)) is the set of all sequential equilibrium (expected) payo¤s for player 2.
This result says that delegation may alter the equilibrium outcome of an extensive form game
that would obtain in the absence of delegation in a very large class of games when the cost of
delegation is small. Notice that unobserved delegation expands the set of equilibrium outcomes to
include those in which the delegate best responds to the outside party’s strategy from the perspec-
tive of the principal’s preferences, but not necessarily in a sequentially rational manner, whereas
the outside party plays sequentially rationally. In that sense delegation achieves a commitment
e¤ect even under unobservable contracts by freeing the principal from the straitjacket of sequential
rationality, which in turn enables him to issue threats (that would otherwise be incredible) via his
delegate. A more detailed intuition behind this theorem is provided at the end of this section.
The next question is if one can strengthen the argument for delegation by showing that reason-
able requirements of rationality ensure that strategic delegation is bound to alter the equilibrium
26Formally speaking, Corollary 1 is not implied by Proposition 1 since in the latter result we have assumed that
¡ is an extensive game with perfect information. However, as we shall stress in Section 6 again, Proposition 1 also
applies to any extensive game with a unique sequential equilibrium (and hence to normal form games with a unique
equilibrium). The proof of this version of Proposition 1 is analogous to the one we shall provide in Section 7.
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outcome of an extensive form principals-only game in a way that bene…ts the delegating principal.
Put more precisely, the query at hand is this: Given a one-sided delegation environment [¡; ±; c];
is there any well-supported equilibrium of ¤(¡; ±; c) in which delegation does not take place?
Of course, the requirement of well-supportedness is indeed needed in the statement of this
query, for we know that there exist sequential equilibria in which delegation does not obtain.
(Recall Section 2.) As noted earlier, a major point of the present paper is that such equilibria
are unreasonable, and a suitable forward induction and/or out-of-equilibrium behavior restriction
argument will eliminate all equilibria that envisage a neutral role for delegation. We propose the
notion of “well-supportedness” in order to formalize this point, and examine the implications of
the possibility of delegation with respect to well-supported equilibria.
Our second main result provides a complete answer to the query stated above by characterizing
the conditions under which delegation obtains in any well-supported equilibrium.
Theorem 2. There exists an ` > 0 such that
¯2[;](:D) =
(
1; if ¦SPE2 = max¦
NE¤1
2 (¡)
0; if ¦SPE2 < max¦
NE¤1
2 (¡)
for any well-supported equilibrium (¯; ¹) 2 SEw-s(¤(¡; ±; c)) and any ± + c < `.
But does the presence of delegation imply that the pre-delegation outcome of the principals-only
game will be altered? The answer is yes. An easy corollary of Theorems 1 and 2 is that, when
delegation occurs, this always (strictly) bene…ts the delegating party, and hence the pre-delegation
outcome (i.e., the subgame perfect equilibrium of ¡) is bound to be altered through delegation in
a payo¤-relevant way in any well-supported equilibrium.
Consequently, in a well-supported equilibrium, player 2 will choose not to delegate if he is already
in an advantageous situation in the principals-only game ¡ (in the sense that the pre-delegation
outcome is already the best that he can achieve in any Nash equilibrium) whereas he will delegate
if there is a Nash equilibrium in which he obtains a payo¤ strictly greater than his subgame perfect
equilibrium payo¤ and in which player 1 plays sequentially rationally. So, for instance, in any
(discrete) Stackelberg duopoly situation, the leader …rm will not choose to delegate the decision-
making power. On the other hand, by Theorem 2, the follower …rm will (generically) choose to
delegate the decision-making to an agent even when the incentive contracts are fully unobservable.
Moreover, the delegation decision will certainly bene…t the follower …rm. Therefore, in sequential
market games, it turns out that there is good reason to take Fersthman-Judd like delegation results
seriously even in the presence of unobservable contracts.
Finally, to bring to the fore the basic intuitions behind these results, we now sketch the main
steps of their proofs. The formal demonstrations are relegated to Section 7.
1. (Lemmas 1-2) The …rst step is to notice that any contract o¤ered with positive probability
in a sequential equilibrium of ¤(¡; ±; c) is accepted with probability one and conditional on
accepting such a contract agent A best responds to player 1’s strategy according to the
preferences of the principal. This is because (i) rejection leads to an expected payo¤ of
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¦SPE2 ¡c; which is worse than the no-delegation payo¤ ¦SPE2 ; (ii) if the contract does not lead
the agent to best respond under that contract, then the principal can design an alternative
(acceptable) contract that would force the agent best respond to player 1, thereby increasing
the principal’s expected payo¤.
2. (Lemmas 3-5) The next step is to show that, given his beliefs about the contracts, the equi-
librium behavior of player 1 in ¤ after delegation, induces a sequentially rational strategy in
the principals-only game ¡:
3. (Lemma 6) The above observations and the fact that player 2 would never delegate to obtain
a payo¤ strictly smaller than his SPE payo¤ implies that ¦SE2 (¤) µ f¦2 2 co¦NE
¤
1
2 (¡) : ¦2 >
¦SPE2 g: Furthermore, for small enough cost of delegation, the converse containment holds as
well, i.e., ¦SE2 (¤) ¶ f¦2 2¦NE
¤
1
2 (¡) : ¦2 > ¦SPE2 g:
4. (Lemma 7) If the cost of delegation is small enough, then player 2 never mixes between not
delegating and o¤ering a contract. This is because the set of gross payo¤s that can be obtained
by delegation is f¦2 2 ¦NE
¤
1
2 (¡) : ¦2 > ¦
SPE
2 g: So, if ± + c < ` ´ minf® 2 ¦NE
¤
1
2 (¡) : ® >
¦SPE2 g¡¦SPE2 , all equilibria involving delegation yields player 2 a net equilibrium payo¤ which
is strictly greater than ¦SPE2 : Therefore, player 2 cannot be indi¤erent between delegating
and not delegating in any sequential equilibria.
Steps (3) and (4) then imply that ¦SE2 (¤) = f¦2 2 ¦NE
¤
1
2 (¡) : ¦2 > ¦SPE2 g for small enough
± + c: This establishes Theorem 1.
5. (Lemma 8) The next step is to prove that well-supportedness demands that player 2 chooses
not to delegate only if there exists no equilibrium that involves delegation. To see this,
let (¯¤; ¹¤) be a well-supported equilibrium in which player 2 chooses not to delegate with
probability one (recall step (4)), and thus receives ¦SPE2 : Now suppose that there exists an
equilibrium (¯; ¹) which involves delegation. From our earlier observations, (¯; ¹) must be
yielding player 2 a net payo¤ strictly greater than ¦SPE2 for small ± + c: Also, by de…nition
of well-supportedness, the strategy of player 1 must be the same in ¯¤ and ¯, following an
information set, say I; that is reached by equilibrium ¯: One can show that player 2 can
deviate in strategy pro…le ¯¤ by o¤ering a contract which, under ¯¤A; makes the agent reach
information set I with probability 1, and then play in a way such that the net payo¤ of player
2 is the same with his payo¤ under strategy pro…le ¯: In other words, there is a deviation
for player 2 in equilibrium (¯¤; ¹¤) which gives him a payo¤ strictly greater than ¦SPE2 : This
contradicts that (¯¤; ¹¤) is a sequential equilibrium.
Now observe that Theorem 1 implies that if ¦SPE2 = max¦
NE¤1
2 (¡); there cannot be any sequen-
tial equilibrium that involves delegation (since ±+c > 0). On the other hand, for small enough ±+c;
if ¦SPE2 < max¦
NE¤1
2 (¡); then by Theorem 1, there exists a sequential equilibrium with delegation.
Thus applying steps (4) and (5) yields ¯2[;](:D) = 0; and establishes Theorem 2.
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6 Caveats, Extensions and Concluding Remarks
Two-Sided Delegation. We assumed above that only one of the parties has the opportunity to
delegate. A natural question, therefore, is if the …ndings reported here still have a “bite” if both
of the principals have an opportunity to delegate. This problem is analyzed in Koçkesen (1999b)
where it is assumed that prior to the game both principals can o¤er contracts to their delegates
without being informed about whether the other party delegates or not. The party that plays
the game (either the principal or the delegate) knows the identity (but not the contract) of her
opponent in the game phase. The …rst result is that the set of sequential equilibrium outcomes
of the two-sided delegation game is a subset of Nash equilibrium outcomes of the principals-only
game, which is the counterpart of Proposition 1 in this paper.
However, making more precise predictions is possible only by considering a subset of sequential
equilibria in which neither principal randomizes between delegating and o¤ering a contract (they
can, however, randomize between contracts). It is then possible to show that, in all such equilibria
where only principal i delegates, the set of equilibrium gross payo¤s is equal the set of Nash
equilibrium payo¤s of the principals-only game where principal i receives more than her SPE payo¤,
and the other party plays sequentially rationally. Furthermore, the set of equilibrium payo¤s in
which both parties delegate is equal to the set of Nash equilibrium payo¤s in which both principals
receive more than their individually rational payo¤s (i.e., their minmax payo¤s). This second
result echoes our Theorem 1, and also indicates the potential use of delegation by the principals as
a cooperative device to attain Pareto improvements over the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome.
As for the implications of well-supported equilibrium for delegation, Koçkesen (1999b) shows
that only a weaker version of Theorem 2 applies to two-sided delegation games. Namely, if there
exists no sequential equilibrium in which one or both principals randomize between delegating and
not delegating, and if in the principals-only game any one of the principals can bene…t by not
playing in a sequentially rational manner, then at least one of the principals will choose to delegate
in any well-supported equilibrium.
Renegotiation. An important assumption in our model is that contracts cannot be renegotiated
once the outside party starts taking actions. This could be due to the physical impossibility of
renegotiation, as it is the case in closed-door negotiations, or due to the fact that renegotiation is
limited through a third party enforcement, or because it is too costly.27
In the framework of our paper, however, if costless renegotiation can take place at any point
in the game and if the principal and the agent are symmetrically informed throughout the game,
then delegation, with observed or unobserved contracts, would have no commitment power. This
is because, due to the Pareto improving renegotiation opportunities, the delegate must behave
sequentially rationally from the perspective of the delegating principal in any sequential equilibrium
of such a delegation game. This may be contrasted with the work of Dewatripont (1988) and
27For instance, in the ultimatum bargaining game of Section 2, if renegotiation is as costly as the initial contract
and 1 6 c < 4¡ ±; then delegation remains a sequential equilibrium even when renegotiation is allowed throughout
the game.
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Caillaud et al. (1995) who show that, if there is asymmetric information between the principal
and the delegate at the time of contracting, publicly announced contracts may have a commitment
value even if they are renegotiable prior to the game stage.28
Within the con…nes of the present framework, therefore, the positive results of this paper on
the possibility of strategic delegation have applicability to real-world scenarios only to the extent
that renegotiation is costly and/or limited.
Larger Classes of Principals-Only Games. While we have studied in Section 5 only those perfect
information principals-only games with a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, it is easy
to generalize the present …ndings to larger classes of games. For instance, let ¡ be any …nite





proof of Theorem 2 modi…es in a trivial manner to show that, whenever ¦SE2 < max¦
NE¤1
2 (¡) and
0 < ±+ c < minf® 2¦NE2 (¡) : ® > ¦SE2 g¡¦SE2 , player 2 chooses to delegate with probability one
in all well-supported equilibria of ¤(¡; ±; c).
Another interesting extension of our model obtains by considering the simultaneous move
principals-only games. As Corollary 1 and Theorem 2 (as extended in the previous paragraph)
show, if ¡ is a normal form game with a unique Nash equilibrium, then delegation never obtains
in any equilibrium of the delegation game. However, as noted by a referee of this journal, if ¡ has
multiple Nash equilibria, although there may exist sequential equilibria with no delegation, forward
induction type of re…nements may lead to a selection in which the delegating principal obtains a
strategic advantage. For example, if the principals-only game is that of the Battle of the Sexes
game of Section 3 (but without the outside option), and if the cost of delegation is small enough,
then all well-supported equilibria of the induced delegation game (which may or may not involve
delegation) lead to the principal’s preferred Nash outcome (T;L). This further emphasizes the two
di¤erent dimensions of our results: …rst, if the underlying game is an extensive form game with a
unique equilibrium outcome, it is possible that delegation would obtain as a sequential equilibrium
of the induced delegation game; and, second, even if the underlying game is a simultaneous move
game with multiple equilibria, the fact that delegation is a costly and observable decision may
lead to equilibrium selection among the multiple Nash equilibria, provided that one subscribes to
forward induction type re…nements.
Principal-Agent Bargaining. Another aspect of the present model which could be fruitfully gen-
eralized is the bargaining process between the principal and the delegate. We assumed here that
principal makes a “take it or leave it” o¤er to the delegate within a symmetric and complete infor-
mation context. In reality, of course, these assumptions are rarely valid. An interesting conjecture is
that the existence of asymmetric information between the principal and the delegate might restrict
the contracts that would be o¤ered in equilibrium in such a manner that Theorem 2 holds true un-
der even weaker re…nements of sequential equilibrium than what we have proposed. Furthermore,
28Since the principals-only games considered by these studies are simultaneous move games, the latter quali…cation is
easily acceptable. In our model where the principals-only games have a sequential structure, however, this quali…cation
is quite pressing.
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the bargaining environment between the principal and the agent may impose limitations on the
renegotiation possibilities later on, which may restore some commitment power to delegation even
under renegotiation. The analysis of these issues, while certainly a promising avenue of research,
falls outside the scope of the present paper.
Experiments. The main …ndings reported in this paper are based on a particular equilibrium
re…nement the empirical validity of which must be tested against the data. An obvious way to
conduct this test is of course via experiments in which agents play a delegation game such as
the simple bargaining game presented in Section 2. Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) conducts an
experimental test of strategic delegation under observable and unobservable contracts within the
context of such an ultimatum bargaining game. They provide some results which are not really
in line with any of the theoretical results in the literature including those in Fershtman and Kalai
(1997). We should note, however, that the structure of what Fershtman and Gneezy de…ne as a
delegation game is not the same as what we used in this paper. In particular, in their setting
contract space is de…ned di¤erently and the player who delegates does not have the option of
playing the game himself. Consequently, testing the empirical validity of the theory we proposed
here remains as an integral part of our future research agenda.
7 Proofs
A. Consistency and Sequential Rationality
Given an extensive form game ¨ ´ [N;H;P; (Ii; ¼i)i2N ]; a strategy pro…le ¯; and h; h0 2 H; we
let p[¯ jh](h0) be the probability of reaching history h0; conditional on h being reached and from
there on the game being played according to ¯: Also de…ne O[¯ jh] as the probability distribution
over terminal nodes induced by ¯; conditional on h being reached. Given any strategy pro…le ¯;





To simplify the notation, we write ¦i(¯) for ¦i(¯ j ;); the expected payo¤ of player i induced by ¯
in the entire game. The expected payo¤ of player i conditional on his/her information set I being
reached is de…ned as




In turn, an assessment (¯; ¹) is said to be sequentially rational if, for all i 2 N and all I 2 Ii,
¦i(¯; ¹ j I) > ¦i((¯0i; ¯¡i); ¹ j I) for all ¯0i 2 Si(¨):
It is called consistent if there is a sequence of completely mixed assessments ((¯n; ¹n)); where each
¹n is derived from ¯n by the Bayes rule, that converges to (¯; ¹): A consistent and sequentially ra-
tional assessment is called a sequential equilibrium (which is subject to the tie-breaking assumption
mentioned in the …nal paragraph of Section 4 in the case of a delegation game).
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B. Preliminary Observations
Consider a one-sided delegation environment [¡; ±; c] and let (¯¤; ¹¤) 2SE(¤(¡; ±; c)): Clearly, for
each f 2 f0; ±gZ ; the behavioral strategy ¯¤A induces a behavioral strategy in the game ¡; which is
de…ned as
b¤f;2[h] ´ ¯¤A[f; a; h]; h 2 H(2):
Similarly, ¯¤1 induces a behavioral strategy b¤1 2 S1(¡); i.e.,
b¤1[h] ´ ¯¤1[f(f; a; h) : f 2 f0; ±gZg]; h 2 H(1):
For any h 2 H; we denote by o[b¤1; b¤f;2 jh] the probability distribution over terminal nodes that
will be reached if each player plays the game ¡ according to the strategy pro…le (b¤1; b¤f;2) 2 S(¡),
conditional on h being reached. If h = ;; we simply write o[b¤1; b¤f;2] for o[b¤1; b¤f;2 j ;]: Consequently,









(G is similarly de…ned for contract g.) The expected payo¤ of player 2 (gross of the payment to







Of course, we have ¦¤2(¯






f;2)¡ F (b¤1; b¤f;2)¡ c
´
+ (1 ¡ p) ¡¦SPE2 ¡ c¢ where p =
¯¤A[f ](a); so that
¦¤2(¯
¤ j f) = ¦¤2(¯¤ j f; a) = ¦2(b¤1; b¤f;2)¡ F (b¤1; b¤f;2)¡ c (2)
for any f with ¯¤A[f ](a) = 1:
C. Proof of Proposition 1
In what follows, we …x a one-sided delegation environment [¡; ±; c]; and denote the delegation game
¤(¡; ±; c) by ¤ for brevity. For any equilibrium strategy pro…le ¯¤ in ¤; we let
C(¯¤2) ´ supp(¯¤2[;])nf:Dg:
Lemma 1. Let (¯¤; ¹¤) 2SE(¤): For any f 2 C(¯¤2); we have
(a) ¦¤2(¯
¤ j f) > ¦SPE2 ;
(b) ¦¤2(¯
¤ j f) > ¦¤2(¯¤ j g) for all g 2 f0; ±gZ with equality for g 2 C(¯¤2);
(c) ¦¤2(¯
¤ j f) = ¦SPE2 if ¯¤2[;](:D) 2 (0; 1):
Proof. Notice that ¦¤2(¯




2[;](g)¦¤2(¯¤ j g) since ¦¤2(¯¤ j:D) =
¦SPE2 by sequential rationality. But then, ¦
¤
2(¯
¤ j f) < ¦SPE2 and rationality at ; would entail that
¯¤2[;](f) = 0 for any contract f; which proves part (a). Parts (b) and (c) are proved similarly. ¤
Lemma 2. Let (¯¤; ¹¤) 2SE(¤): For any f 2 C(¯¤2); we have ¯¤A[f ](a) = 1; F (b¤1; b¤f;2) = ±; and
b¤f;2 2BR2(b¤1):29
29As usual, BRi stands for the best response correspondence of player i in the principals-only game ¡:
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Proof. Fix an arbitrary f 2C(¯¤2) and take any strategy b¤2 2 BR2(b¤1): Consider now the function
g 2 f0; ±gZ de…ned as
g(z) ´
(
±; if z 2 supp(o[b¤1; s2])
0; otherwise
(3)
where s2 2 supp(b¤f;2):30 We proceed by means of claims.
Claim 2.1. b¤g;2 2 BR2(b¤1), G(b¤1; b¤g;2) = ±; and ¯¤A[g](a) = 1:




g;2]) µ supp(o[b¤1; s2]): (4)
This yields G(b¤1; b¤g;2) = ± and ¯
¤
A[g](a) = 1 (since the agent is assumed to accept any contract that
pays her ±).
Take any s02 2 supp(b¤g;2): If supp(o[b¤1; s2]) µ supp(o[b¤1; s02]) did not hold, this would mean that
there exists a history h 2 H(2) that is reached with positive probability under both (b¤1; s2) and
(b¤1; s02) and that satis…es s2(h) 6= s02(h): But then it is obvious that this would imply supp(o[b¤1; s2])\
supp(o[b¤1; s02]) = ; which contradicts (4). Consequently, we have supp(o[b¤1; s2]) µ supp(o[b¤1; s02]).
Since the converse containment follows from (4), we …nd o[b¤1; s2](z) = o[b¤1; s02](z) for all z 2 Z:
Therefore, since s2 2 BR2(b¤1), we must also have s02 2 BR2(b¤1): Given that s02 is arbitrary in
supp(b¤g;2); this establishes that b¤g;2 2 BR2(b¤1): k
Claim 2.2. ¯¤A[f ](a) = 1:
Proof of Claim 2.2. By the tie-breaking assumption, ¯¤A[f ](a) 2 f0; 1g: But if ¯¤A[f ](a) = 0 was the
case, we would have ¦¤2(¯
¤ j f) = ¦SPE2 ¡ c < ¦SPE2 which contradicts Lemma 1(a). k
Claim 2.3. F (b¤1; b¤f;2) = ±:
Proof of Claim 2.3. Since Claim 2.2 shows that the agent accepts the contract f with probability
one, her expected payo¤ conditional on accepting this contract must be equal to her outside option,
that is, F (b¤1; b¤f;2) > ±: The claim then follows from the fact that the highest possible expected
payo¤ of the agent is ±: k
Our objective now is to establish that ¦2(b¤1; b¤f;2) > ¦2(b¤1; b2) for all b2 2 S2(¡): To derive a
contradiction, we assume that ¦2(b¤1; b¤f;2) < ¦2(b
¤
1; b2) for some b2 2 S2(¡). Then, by Claim 2.1,




g;2): But then using Claims 2.1-3, we …nd
¦¤2(¯
¤ j f)¡¦¤2(¯¤ j g) = (¦2(b¤1; b¤f;2)¡¦2(b¤1; b¤g;2)) + (± ¡ F (b¤1; b¤f;2)) < 0
which contradicts Lemma 1(b). The proof of Lemma 2 is then complete. ¤
Lemma 3. Let (¯¤; ¹¤) 2SE(¤); and let (f 0; a; z) 2 supp(O[¯¤]): There exists a Nash equilibrium
b^ 2NE(¡) such that z 2 supp(o[b^]) and b^1 is a best response to some b2 2 S2(¡) at any history
h 2 H(1):
30As is obvious, s2 2 supp(b¤f;2) means that s2 is a pure strategy of player 2 such that s2[h](a) = 1 only if
b¤f;2[h](a) > 0 for all h 2 H(2):
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Proof. If C(¯¤2) = ; then the claim is trivially established, so throughout we assume that C(¯¤2) 6= ;:
Let Ho(1) stand for the set of all shortest histories in H(1):31 We let Ih ´ f(f; a; h) : f 2 f0; ±gZg




p[¯¤j;](f; a; h) for all h 2 Ho(1);
It is important to note that the de…nition of Th is independent of ¯¤1 since p[¯
¤j;](f; a; h) is inde-
pendent of ¯¤1 for any shortest history h in H(1): Therefore, by weak consistency and sequential
rationality, we have










¡1 j f; a; h](z)¼1(z)
for all h 2 Ho(1) with p[¯¤j;](f; a; h) > 0 for some f , where Z0 = supp(O[¯1; ¯¤¡1 j f; a; h]). Recall-
ing that b¤1 2 S1(¡) is the behavioral strategy in ¡ induced by ¯¤1; we thus have, for all h 2 Ho(1)
with Th > 0,
















¯¤2[;](f)p[¯¤jf ](f; a; h)o[b1; b¤f;2 jh](z)¼1(z) (5)
where the sums run through all f 2 C(¯¤2) and z 2 Z: (Recall that, for all such h; consistency
assures that ¹¤[Ih](f; a; h) = p[¯¤j;](f; a; h)=Th and ¯¤A[f ](a) = 1 for all f 2 C(¯¤2) by Lemma
2.) But notice that (5) holds trivially for any h 2 Ho(1) such that p[¯¤j;](f; a; h) = 0 for all
f 2 f0; ±gZ ; since in this case the maximand of the associated optimization problem is identically
zero. Consequently, (5) holds for all h 2 Ho(1); and we thus have








p[¯¤jf ](f; a; h)o[b1; b¤f;2 jh](z)
!
¼1(z): (6)
Claim 3.1. For all z 2 Z \Sh2Ho (1)H(h);X
h2Ho (1)
p[¯¤jf ](f; a; h)o[b1; b¤f;2 jh](z) = o[b1; b¤f;2](z):
Proof of Claim 3.1. Take any z 2 Z \ Sh2Ho (1)H(h): By de…nition of Ho(1); there can be at
most one h in Ho(1) that is consistent with z: By the choice of z; therefore, there exists a unique
hz 2 Ho(1) that is consistent with z: But then, o[b1; b¤f;2 jh](z) = 0 for all h 6= hz; so, by de…nition
of p[¯¤jf ];X
h2Ho (1)
p[¯¤jf ](f; a; h)o[b1; b¤f;2 jh](z) = p[¯¤jf ](f; a; hz)o[b1; b¤f;2 jhz](z) = o[b1; b¤f;2](z): k
31That is, Ho (1) ´ fh 2 H(1) : there does not exist any h0 2 H(1) and h00 6= ; such that h = (h0; h00)g:
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Using Claim 3.1 and (6), we …nd






since it is readily observed that, for any f; the probability o[b1; b¤f;2](z) is independent of b1 for any
terminal history z =2 Sh2Ho (1)H(h): Now let ¸(f) = ¯2[;](f)1¡ ¯2[;](:D) for all f 2 C(¯¤2): We haveP
f2C(¯¤2) ¸(f) = 1 and
































so that, by (7), we have b¤1 2 argmaxb12S1(¡)¦1(b1; b^2), and hence b¤1 2 BR1(b^2) where b^2 2 S2(¡)




f;2: But since, by Lemma 2, b
¤
f;2 2BR2(b¤1) for all f 2C(¯¤2); we
also have b^2 2BR2(b¤1): Therefore, (b¤1; b^2) 2NE(¡): Furthermore, sequential rationality of player 1




for some probability measure ¹ on f0; ±gZ : Moreover, if (f 0; a; z) 2 supp(O[¯¤]); then it must be
the case that f 0 2 C(¯¤2) and z 2 supp(o[b¤1; b¤f 0;2]); and hence z 2 supp(o[b¤1; b^2]). ¤
To state the next lemma, let h 2 HnZ be any non-terminal history, and de…ne H(h) as the set
of all histories consistent with h:32
Lemma 4. Let b1 2 S1 (¡) and let Bh2(b1) be the set of all b2 2 S2(¡) such that b1 2BR1(b2 jh) at
an history h 2 H(1): If Bh2(b1) 6= ; for all h 2 H(1); thenTfBh2(b1) : h 2 H(h¤) \H(1)g 6= ; for any h¤ 2 H(1):
Proof. Fix a b1 2 S1(¡) and a h¤ 2 H(1): Since H(h¤) \H(1) is obviously a non-empty …nite set,
we may write, for some positive integer n; H(h¤)\H(1) = fh1; h2; : : : ; hng where jh1j 6 ¢ ¢ ¢ 6 jhnj :
We will prove by induction that
TfBhj2 (b1) : n > j > kg 6= ; for all k = 1; 2; : : : ; n:
The statement is trivially true for k = n: Now, suppose that it is true for k = l 6 n: Let
b¤2 2Bhl¡12 (b1) and ¹b2 2 Bhn2 (b1) \ ¢ ¢ ¢ \ Bhl2 (b1): Also let Hk = fhk; hk+1; : : : ; hng ; for all k 2
f1; 2; : : : ; ng : If (b1; b¤2) reaches every history in H l with positive probability, then b1 must be a best
response to b¤2 at every history in H l as well, so b¤2 2
TfBhj2 (b1) : n > j > l ¡ 1g; and we are done.
Suppose, therefore, that there exists a history in H l which is precluded by (b1; b¤2): Let ht be the
shortest such history: De…ne
b02[h] =
(
¹b2[h]; if h 2 H(ht) \H(2)
b¤2[h]; if h 2 H (2) nH(ht)
:
32Formally speaking, h00 2 H(h) i¤ h00 = (h; h0) for some h0:
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Since b1 2 BR1(b¤2 jhl¡1); the probability of reaching ht under (b1; b¤2) is zero, and all h 2 fhl¡1; : : : ;
ht¡1g are reached with positive probability, we have b1 2 BR1(b02 jh) for all such h, which means
that b02 2 Bht¡12 (b1)\¢¢¢\Bhl¡12 (b1): But, by induction hypothesis, we have b02 2 Bhn2 (b1)\¢¢¢\Bht2 (b1);
so combining these observations we again get b¤2 2
TfBhj2 (b1) : n > j > l ¡ 1g. ¤
Lemma 5. Let (b¤1; b¤2) 2 NE(¡): If, for any h 2 H(1);
b¤1 2 arg max
b12S1(¡)
¦1(b1; b2 jh) for some b2 2 S2(¡);
then there exists a behavioral strategy pro…le (b01; b02) 2 NE¤1(¡) such that o[b01; b02] = o[b¤1; b¤2]:
Proof. If (b¤1; b¤2) 2 NE¤1(¡) there is nothing to prove. So, suppose that b¤1 is not a best response to
b¤2 at some history. Since (b¤1; b¤2) 2 NE(¡); any such history must be o¤-the-path of (b¤1; b¤2). Let
H^ = fh1; h2; : : : ; hng denote the set of all such histories. Clearly, for each hj 2 H^; there exists an
earlier history h 2 H such that, when b¤P (h)[h] is played, hj can never be reached, no matter how
the behavioral strategies at other histories are speci…ed. Let ¹hj denote the shortest one among all
those histories. Notice that since there is a unique sequence of actions that reach hj ; the history
¹hj is uniquely de…ned.
Partition H^ into m 6 n disjoint sets, H^®; ® = 1; : : :m; such that two histories hj and hk belong
to the same set H^® if and only if ¹hj = ¹hk: Let H^min® be the set of the shortest histories in each
H^®:We will now construct a strategy pro…le (b01; b02) 2 NE¤1(¡) with o[b01; b02] = o[b¤1; b¤2]. To do this,
…x an ®; and pick any h 2 H^®: Assume …rst that P (¹h) = 1: Then, change b¤1 at each history in
H^® \ H(1) so as to make the new strategy a best response to b¤2 at those histories. (We can do
this by applying a simple backward induction in every subgame starting with a history in H^min® ).
Assume next that P (¹h) = 2: In this case, since b¤1 is a best response to some b2 at any history, we
can use Lemma 4 to change b¤2 to make b¤1 a best response to it at all histories in H^® \H(1): Leave
(b¤1; b¤2) unchanged in all histories which do not belong to H^ and call the newly constructed strategy
pro…le (b01; b02):
By construction, b01 is a best response to b02 at every history. Furthermore, since (b01; b02) is
di¤erent from (b¤1; b¤2) at only those histories which are not reached by (b¤1; b¤2) we have o[b01; b02] =
o[b¤1; b¤2]: Therefore, if we can show that (b01; b02) 2 NE(¡); we will be done. To do this, notice that,
since b02 is di¤erent from b¤2 at only those histories excluded by b¤2 we have ¦i(b1; b¤2) = ¦i(b1; b02) for
all b1 2 S1(¡); i = 1; 2: Therefore, given that (b¤1; b¤2) 2 NE(¡), we have ¦1(b01; b02) = ¦1(b¤1; b¤2) >
¦1(b1; b
¤
2) = ¦1(b1; b
0
2) for all b1 2 S1(¡): That ¦2(b01; b02) > ¦1(b01; b2) holds for all b2 2 S2(¡) is
shown in the analogous way, and this completes the proof. ¤
The proof of Proposition 1 is now completed upon applying Lemmas 3 and 5.
D. Proofs of Theorems 1, 2 and Corollary 2
De…ne
¦SE2 (¤) ´ f~¦2(¯) : (¯; ¹) 2 SE(¤) for some system of beliefs ¹g;
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where




for any behavioral strategy pro…le ¯ 2 S(¤): Since, by Lemma 2, all contracts f 2 C(¯¤2) are
accepted in equilibrium, ~¦2(¯) is the expected payo¤ of player 2 (gross of the compensation he
pays to the delegate in case of a hire and the contracting cost) in the equilibrium (¯; ¹): The
following important lemma points to the close connection between the sets ¦NE
¤
1
2 (¡) and ¦
SE
2 (¤);
and constitutes a crucial step towards proving Theorem 1.
Lemma 6. (a) ¦SE2 (¤) µ f¦2 2 co¦NE
¤
1
2 (¡) : ¦2 > ¦SPE2 g:
(b) There exists an ` > 0 such that, for all ± + c < `;
¦SE2 (¤) ¶ f¦2 2¦NE
¤
1
2 (¡) : ¦2 > ¦SPE2 g:
Proof. (a) Let ¦2 2 ¦SE2 (¤) and take any (¯¤; ¹¤) 2SE(¤) such that ~¦2(¯¤) = ¦2: By Lemma
1(a), we have ¦2(b¤1; b¤f;2) > ¦
¤
2(¯
¤ j f) > ¦SPE2 so that ~¦2(¯¤) > ¦SPE2 ; and it remains to show that
¦2 2 co ¦NE
¤
1
2 (¡): Notice …rst that if ¯
¤
2[;](:D) = 1; then ¦2 = ~¦2(¯¤) = ¦SPE2 2¦NE
¤
1
2 (¡); so we





Recall that (b¤1; b^2) 2NE(¡); and, by Lemma 5, there exists a (b01; b02) 2 NE¤1(¡) with o[b01; b02] =






















and the claim follows.
To complete the proof we need to consider the case in which ¯¤2[;](:D) 2 (0; 1): But this case
is easily settled by noticing that
~¦2(¯








= ¯¤2[;](:D)¦SPE2 + (1¡ ¯¤2[;](:D))¦2(b¤1; b^2)
= ¯¤2[;](:D)¦SPE2 + (1¡ ¯¤2[;](:D))¦2(b01; b02)
2 co¦NE¤12 (¡);
where we again used the bilinearity of ¦2 and Lemma 5.
(b) Let ¦2 2 ¦NE
¤
1
2 (¡) and ¦2 > ¦SPE2 : We need to show that there exists a (¯; ¹) 2SE(¤)
such that ~¦2(¯) = ¦2: We …rst introduce some notation and then construct such an equilibrium
by distinguishing between two cases.
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[Case 1. ¦2 = ¦SPE2 ] Let b
SPE 2 SPE(¡), and, for each f 2 f0; ±gZ ; take any bf 2 S2(¡) such
that bf [h] = bf;h[h] for all h 2 H(2); where




o[bSPE1 ; b2 jh](z)f(z):
Let g ´ ±1supp(o[bSPE ])); and de…ne the behavioral strategy pro…le ¯ 2 S(¤) as follows: For all
f 2 f0; ±gZ ;
¯1[:D;h] = ¯1[f; a; h] = ¯1[f; r; h] = bSPE1 [h] for all h 2 H(1);
¯2[;](:D) = 1; ¯2[:D;h] = ¯2[f; r; h] = bSPE2 [h] for all h 2 H(2);
¯A[f ](a) =
(
1; if F (bSPE1 ; b
f ) = ±
0; otherwise
; ¯A[g](a) = 1;
¯A[f; a; h] =
(
bSPE2 [h]; if f = g
bf [h]; otherwise
for all h 2 H(2);
On the other hand, we de…ne ¹ 2 B(¤) by specifying that ¹[I](g; µ; h) = 1 for all I = f(f; µ; h) :
f 2 f0; ±gZg 2 I¤1 ; µ 2 fa; rg:
Sequential rationality of (¯; ¹) easily follows. To prove consistency, consider the completely
mixed assessments (¯"; ¹") de…ned as follows: Let hmax be the longest history in ¡; and
¯"2[;] (g) = "; ¯"2[;] (f) = "jhmaxj+2; for all f 2 f0; ±gZn fgg :
For all i 2 f1; 2; Ag ; f 2 f0; ±gZ ; µ 2 fa; rg ; and I = f(f; µ; h) : f 2 f0; ±gZg 2 I¤1 ,
¯"i [f; µ; h] (x) =
(




¹" [I] (f; µ; h) =
p[¯" j ;](f; µ; h)P
f 02f0;±gZ
p[¯" j ;](f 0; µ; h) :
Clearly, ¯" ! ¯ as "! 0; and ¹" is derived from ¯" using Bayes’ rule. Moreover,
¹" [I] (g; µ; h) =
p[¯" j ;](g; µ; h)
p[¯" j ;](g; µ; h) + P
f2f0;±gZnfgg
p[¯" j ;](f; µ; h)
> "(1¡ (
¯¯f0; ±gZ ¯¯¡ 1)")"jhmaxj
"(1¡ (jf0; ±gZ j ¡ 1)")"jhmaxj + "jhmaxj+2 (1¡ ") (jf0; ±gZ j ¡ 1)
! 1
as "! 0:33
33What makes (¯; ¹) an equilibrium is the fact that in this assessment player 1 believes that player 2 has aligned
the incentives of A with his own perfectly at all out-of-equilibrium information sets.
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[Case 2. ¦2 > ¦SPE2 ] Since ¦2 2¦NE
¤
1
2 (¡); there exists a b^ 2NE(¡) such that ¦2(b^) = ¦2; and
b^1 is sequentially rational: Let g ´ ±1supp(o[b^]); and de…ne the behavioral strategy pro…le ¯ 2 S(¤)
as follows: For all f 2 f0; ±gZ ;
¯1[:D;h] = ¯1[f; r; h] = bSPE1 [h]; ¯1[f; a; h] = b^1 [h] for all h 2 H(1);
¯2[;](g) = 1; ¯2[:D;h] = ¯2[f; r; h] = bSPE2 [h] for all h 2 H(2);
¯A[f ](a) =
(
1; if F (b^1; bf ) = ±
0; otherwise
; ¯A[g](a) = 1;
¯A[f; a; h] =
(
b^2[h]; if f = g
bf [h]; otherwise
for all h 2 H(2);
with bf 2 S2(¡) being such that bf [h] = bf;h[h] for all h 2 H(2); where





We de…ne ¹ 2 B(¤) by specifying that ¹[I](g; µ; h) = 1 for all I = f(f; µ; h) : f 2 f0; ±gZg 2 I¤1 ;
µ 2 fa; rg: Proof of sequential rationality and consistency of (¯; ¹) is similar to Case 1 above. ¤
Lemma 7. If ¦SPE2 = max¦
NE¤1
2 (¡); then ¯2[;](:D) = 1: Moreover, there exists an ` > 0 such
that ¯2[;](:D) 2 f0; 1g for any (¯; ¹) 2 SE(¤) and any ± + c < `:





g;2) for all f; g 2C(¯¤2): Therefore, by (8),
~¦2(¯
¤) = ¯¤2[;](:D)¦SPE2 + (1¡ ¯¤2[;](:D))¦2(b¤1; b¤f;2) (9)
for any f 2C(¯¤2): Now if ¦SPE2 = max¦NE
¤
1
2 (¡); then by Lemma 6(a), ~¦2(¯
¤) = ¦SPE2 and
(9) yields ¦2(b¤1; b¤f;2) = ¦
SPE





f;2) ¡ ± ¡ c < ¦SPE2 for any f 2C(¯¤2): In view of Lemma 1(a), this can hold only if
C(¯¤2) = f:Dg; which implies that ¯¤2(;)(:D) = 1:
Assume next that ¦2 > ¦SPE2 for some ¦2 2¦NE
¤
1
2 (¡); and de…ne
` ´ min
n










< 1.) To derive a contradiction,
assume next that ` > ± + c and ¯¤2[;](:D) 2 (0; 1): Then, by Lemma 1(c), ¦¤2(¯¤ j f) = ¦SPE2 so
that, by (2) and Lemma 2, ¦2(b¤1; b¤f;2) = ¦
SPE
2 + ± + c for all f 2C(¯¤2): De…ning ¸ and b^2 as in
the proof of Lemma 3, we thus …nd
¦2(b
¤
















2 + ± + c:
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Lemma 5 implies that there exists a behavioral strategy pro…le (b01; b02) 2NE¤1(¡) with o[b01; b02] =
o[b¤1; b^2]; and with ¦2(b01; b02) = ¦SPE2 +±+c: But then ¦SPE2 +±+c 2 f¦2 2¦NE
¤
1
2 (¡) : ¦2 > ¦
SPE
2 g;
and thus by de…nition of `; we obtain ` 6 ¦SPE2 + ± + c¡¦SPE2 = ± + c: ¤
Proof of Theorem 1. From Lemma 7 and the …rst paragraph of the proof of Lemma 6(a), it follows
that there exists an ` > 0 such that ¦SE2 (¤) µ f¦2 2¦NE
¤
1
2 (¡) : ¦2 > ¦SPE2 g for all any ± + c < `:
The claim then follows from Lemma 6(b). ¤
Lemma 8. Assume that ¦SPE2 < max¦
NE¤1
2 (¡): There exists an ` > 0 such that, whenever ±+ c <
`; for any well-supported equilibrium (¯¤; ¹¤) 2 SE(¤(¡; ±; c)); we have ¯¤2[;](:D) = 1 if and only
if there exists no (¯; ¹) 2 SE(¤(¡; ±; c)) with ¯2[;](:D) < 1:
Proof. Pick an arbitrary (¯¤; ¹¤) 2 SEw-s(¤); choose ` as in Lemma 7, assume that ± + c < `; and
recall that ¯¤2[;](:D) 2 f0; 1g by Lemma 7. So the “if” part of the claim is trivial. To prove the
converse, let ¯¤2[;](:D) = 1 and assume that there exists an equilibrium of ¤ in which delegation
obtains with probability 1. Since ¦SPE2 < max¦
NE¤1
2 (¡); player 1 must move at least once on
the equilibrium path; and this guarantees that player 1 has an information set I 2 J (¯¤) (recall
De…nition 1) visited with positive probability in an equilibrium. Thus, by well-supportedness of
(¯¤; ¹¤); there exists an assessment (¯; ¹) 2 SE(¤; I) such that ¹¤[J ] = ¹[J ] and
¯¤1[J ] = ¯1[J ] for all J 2 I1(I); (10)
where I1(I) is the set of all information sets of player 1 that follows I:
Let us now pick any f 2 C(¯2) such that bf;2 reaches I with positive probability. We have
Claim 8.1. ¦¤2(¯ j f) > ¦SPE2 :
Proof of Claim 8.1. If ¦¤2(¯ j f) = ¦SPE2 held, then we would have ((¯1; ¯02; ¯A); ¹) 2 SE(¤)
where ¯02 2 S2(¤) is de…ned as ¯02[;](:D) ´ 1=2; ¯02[;](g) ´ 2¡1¯2[;](g) for all g 2 f0; ±gZ and
¯02[h] ´ ¯2[h] for all h 2 H¤(2)nf;g: This, however, contradicts Lemma 7. We must then have
¦¤2(¯ j f) 6= ¦SPE2 ; and the claim follows from Lemma 1(a). k
By the choice of f; bf;2 reaches I with positive probability. (Recall that player 1 does not play
a role in I being reached since I = Ih with h being a shortest history in H(1)). We choose any
pure strategy s2 2 supp(bf;2) such that s2 reaches I.34 De…ne next the contract g ´ ±1supp(o[b1;s2]):
Claim 8.2. G(b1; s2) = ± = G(b¤1; b¤g;2); and hence ¯
¤
A[g](a) = 1:
Proof of Claim 8.2. By de…nition of g and sequential rationality, any s02 2 supp(b¤g;2) must reach I
regardless of the strategy choice of player 1. Therefore, all information sets that are reached when
b¤g;2 is played follow I regardless of the play of 1. Then, by (10), we must have o[b1; b¤g;2] = o[b¤1; b¤g;2]:
Since s2 reaches I as well, we also have o[b1; s2] = o[b¤1; s2]: Thus by sequential rationality, we …nd
± > G(b¤1; b¤g;2) > G(b¤1; s2) = G(b1; s2) = ±: k
34Formally speaking, by “s2 reaches I” we mean that I is visited with positive probability via any strategy pro…le
in ¤ such that f is played with positive probability and the agent plays according to s2 upon acceptance of f (recall
Lemma 2). Also notice that since I is the “…rst” information set, s2 reaches I with probability 1:
30
Claim 8.3. ¦2(b1; s2) = ¦2(b¤1; b¤g;2):
Proof of Claim 8.3. By Claim 2.1, we have b¤g;2 2 BR2(b1): Since s2 2 BR2(b1); therefore, we have
¦2(b1; s2) = ¦2(b1; b
¤
g;2): But given that any pure strategy in supp(b
¤
g;2) must reach I; (10) entails
that ¦2(b1; b¤g;2) = ¦2(b¤1; b¤g;2): k
We now consider the behavioral strategy ¯
0
2 2 S2(¤) which is de…ned as follows:
¯02[;](t) ´
(
1; if t = g
0; otherwise
and ¯02[h] = ¯
¤
2[h] for all h 2 H¤(2)nf;g:











g;2)¡G(b¤1; b¤g;2)¡ c = ¦2(b1; s2)¡ ± ¡ c: (11)
On the other hand, by Lemma 2 and the fact that s2 2 BR2(b1);
¦¤2(¯ j f) = ¦2(b1; bf;2)¡ F (b1; s2)¡ c = ¦2(b1; s2)¡ ± ¡ c: (12)




¤); which contradicts the sequential rationality of (¯¤; ¹¤): ¤
Proof of Theorem 2. Let (¯; ¹) 2 SEw-s(¤(¡; ±; c)) and ± + c < `; where ` is chosen small enough
that Theorem 1 and Lemmas 7-8 apply. If ¦SPE2 = max¦
NE¤1
2 (¡); then ¯2[;](:D) = 1 by Lemma 7.
If ¦SPE2 < max¦
NE¤1
2 (¡); then by Theorem 1, there exists a sequential equilibrium with delegation.
Thus by Lemma 8 ¯2[;](:D) < 1; and Lemma 7 completes the proof. ¤
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